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The scheme of the EC competition rules is that Article 81 applies to conduct by two or more undertakings which are consensual, and that Article 
82 applies to unilateral action by a dominant firm. It 
follows that unilateral conduct by a firm that is not 
dominant is not caught at all, which is why in some cases 
fairly outlandish claims of dominance have been made, see 
e.g. Case 75/84 Metro v Commission (No 2) [1986] ECR 
3021; [1987] 1 CMLR 118, paras 79-92; Case 210/81 
Demo-Studio Schmidt v Commission [1983] ECR 3045; [1984] 
1 CMLR 63. However it is important to appreciate that 
conduct which might at first sight appear to be unilateral 
has sometimes been held by the Commission to fall within 
Article 8 1 (1) as an agreement or a concerted practice, and 
that the Commission's decisions in this respect have usually 
been upheld by the Community Courts; however, in Bayer 
AG/Adalat OJ [1996] L 210/1 the Commission stretched 
the notion of an agreement too far, and the decision was 
annulled by the Court of First Instance Case T-41/96, 26 
October 2000, unreported.
The characterisation of apparently independent, unilateral 
action as an agreement is particularly likely to occur in the 
context of relations between a producer and the 
participants in its distribution system: the Commission is 
vigilant in these circumstances to monitor conduct which 
either has the effect of maintaining resale prices or which 
leads to the partitioning of national markets and the 
suppression of parallel trade.
AEG TELEFUNKEN V COMMISSION; FORD 
V COMMISSION
In AEG-Telefunken v Commission Case 107/82~[1983] ECR 
3151; [1984] 3 CMLR 325, the ECJ rejected a claim that 
refusals to supply retail outlets which were objectively 
suitable to handle AEG's goods were unilateral acts falling 
outside Article 81(1). The ECJ held that such refusals
arose out of the contractual relationship between the 
supplier and its established distributors and their mutual 
acceptance, tacit or express, of AEG's intention to exclude 
from the network distributors. AEG's refusals to supply 
were not unilateral but provided proof of an unlawful 
application of its selective distribution system, as their 
number was sufficient to preclude the possibility that they 
were isolated cases not forming part of systematic conduct 
AEG, paras 31-39. In Ford v Commission Cases 25, 26/84 
[1985] ECR 2725; [1985] 3 CMLR 528, the ECJ held 
that a refusal by Ford's German subsidiary to supply 
right hand drive cars to German distributors waso
attributable to the contractual relationship between them. 
The Ford judgment is an extension of AEG. In AEG there 
was an obvious community of interest between the 
distributors who received supplies Irom AEG, that 
'cut price' outlets should not be able to obtain goods and 
undercut their prices; in this case it was easy to see that 
certain assumptions might creep into the relationship 
between AEG and its usual customers. In Ford however the 
German distributors with whom Ford had entered into 
contracts did not themselves benefit from the refusal to 
supply right hand drive cars: the beneficiaries of this 
policy were distributors in the UK, who would be shielded 
from parallel imports. Here the 'unilateral' act held to be 
attributable to the agreements between supplier and 
distributors was not an act for the benefit of those very 
distributors.
SUBSEQUENT CASES
In several decisions after AEG and Ford the Commission 
has applied Article 81(1) to apparently unilateral conduct. 
In Sandoz OJ [1987] L 222/28; [1989] 4 CMLR 628, it 
held that, where there was no written record of agreements 
between a producer and its distributors, unilateral 
measures, including placing the words 'export prohibited' 
on all invoices, were attributable to the continuing
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commercial relationship between the parties and were 
within Article 81(1). On appeal the ECJ upheld the 
Commission's decision Case C-277/87 Sandoz Prodotti 
Farmaceutici Spa v Commission [1990] ECR 1-45; in Vichy OJ 
[1991] L 75/57, upheld on appeal Case T-19/91 Vichy v 
Commission [1992] ECR 11-415, the Commission 
specifically applied paragraph 12 of the Sandoz judgment. 
In Tipp-Ex OJ [1987] E 222/1; [1989] 4 CMER 425, 
upheld on appeal Case C-279/87 Tipp-ex Gmbh v Commission 
[1990] ECR 1-261, the Commission applied the ECJ's 
judgments in AEG and Ford, holding that there was an 
infringement of Article 81 consisting of agreements 
between Tipp-Ex and its authorized dealers regarding the 
mutual protection ol territories. In Bayo-n-ox OJ [1990] E 
21/71; [1990] 4 CMER 930; see also Bayer Dental OJ 
[1990] E 351/46; [1992] 4 CMER 61, goods were 
supplied at a special price on condition that the customers 
use them for their own requirements: they could not resell 
them; this stipulation was contained in circulars sent by the 
supplier to the customers. The Commission said that by 
accepting the products at the special price the customers 
had tacitly agreed to abide by the 'own requirements' 
condition. The fact that a customer is acting contrary to its 
own best interests in agreeing to its supplier's terms does 
not mean that it is not party to a prohibited agreement 
under Article 81(1): see e.g. Gosme/Martell-DMP OJ [1991] 
E 185/23; [1992] 5 CMER 586.
BAYER V COMMISSION
The Commission again characterized apparently 
unilateral action as an agreement in Bayer AG/Adalat OJ 
[1996] E 201/1; on this occasion, however, the CFI 
annulled the decision since, in its view, the Commission 
had failed to prove the existence of an agreement Case T- 
41/96, 26 October 2000, unreported. In order to prevent 
its French and Spanish wholesalers from supplying parallel 
exports to the UK, and thereby to protect its UK pricing 
strategy, Bayer had reduced supplies of the drug Adalat to 
France and Spain. Prices for pharmaceuticals in France 
and Spain were as much as 40% less than in the UK, so 
that the market was ripe for parallel trade. The 
Commission held that a tacit agreement existed between 
Bayer and the wholesalers not to export to the UK 
contrary to Article 81(1): in its view the agreement was 
evidenced by the wholesalers ceasing to supply the UK in 
response to Bayer's tactic of reducing supplies. It has to be 
said that this would appear to be counter-intuitive, given 
that the wholesalers had tried every means possible to defy 
Bayer and to obtain extra supplies for the purpose of 
exporting to the UK: there was no 'common interest' in 
this case between Bayer and the wholesalers, whose 
respective needs were diametrically opposed.
Bayer did not deny that it had reduced the quantities 
delivered to France and Spain, but it argued that it had 
acted unilaterally rather than pursuant to an agreement. 
The Commission's decision was criticised, see Kon and
Schoeffer 'Parallel Imports of Pharmaceutical Products: a 
New Realism or Back to Basics?' [1997] HER 123, 
Eidgard 'Unilateral Refusal to Supply: an Agreement in 
Disguise?' [1997] ECER 352. Bayer obtained a suspension 
of the decision pending judgment order reported at Case 
T-41/96R Bayer AG v Commission [1996] ECR 11-381; 
[1996] 5 CMER 290; see Lasok (1997) 34 CMERev 1309. 
In a very significant judgment, the CFI has now held that 
there was no agreement. After stressing that Article 81(1) 
applies only to conduct that is coordinated bilaterally or 
multilaterally, the Court reviewed the case-law and stated 
that the concept of an agreement 'centres around the 
existence of a concurrence of wills between at least two 
parties, the form in which it is manifested being 
unimportant so long as it constitutes the faithful 
expression of the parties' intention', para 69. It 
acknowledged that there could be an agreement where 
one person tacitly acquiesces in practices and measures 
adopted by another, para 71; however it concluded that 
the Commission had failed both to demonstrate that Bayer 
had intended to impose an export ban, paras 78-110, and 
to prove that the wholesalers had intended to adhere to a 
policy on the part of Bayer to reduce parallel imports, 
paras 111-157. The CFI was satisfied that earlier 
judgments, including Sandoz, Tippex and AEG were 
distinguishable, paras 158-171. It also rejected the 
argument that the wholesalers, by maintaining their 
commercial relations with Bayer after the reduction of 
supplies, could thereby be held to have agreed with it to 
restrain exports, paras 172-182. The Court specifically 
said that a measure taken by a manufacturer that would 
hinder parallel imports is lawful, provided that it is not 
adopted pursuant to a concurrence of wills between it and 
its wholesalers contrary to Article 81(1) and provided that 
it does not amount to an abuse of a dominant position 
contrary to Article 82, para 176. The Court was not 
prepared to extend the scope of Article 81(1), 
acknowledging the importance of 'free enterprise' when 
applying the competition rules, para 180.
The importance of this judgment, which the 
Commission has appealed to The ECJ, cannot be 
overstated. Had the CFI upheld the decision of the 
Commission, the notion that an agreement for the 
purpose of article 81(1) requires consensus between the 
parties would have been eliminated; whilst this would have 
given the Commission greater control over restrictions of 
parallel trade within the Community, it would have done 
so at the expense of the integrity of the competition rules, 
which clearly apprehend unilateral behaviour only where a 
firm has a dominant position in the sense of Article 
82. @
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